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Summary 
This report is meant to provide background and serve as starting point for a series of 
stakeholder discussions on the future of the EU’s value chains based on mineral raw materials 
It describes the transformation the industry is currently undergoing, identifies both the 
challenges and opportunities it faces.   
This report is not intended to give a complete analysis or draw final conclusions, but to 
stimulate further discussion on the most relevant challenges. It attempts to describe the 
controversies and to identify different stakeholder positions. 
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Introduction 
Now that the global manufacturing industry has settled from the resources boom of the early 
21st century, attention is turning to new challenges, notably the increasing demand for mineral 
raw materials stemming from the unfolding digital revolution and the transition to the low-
carbon economy. The drive towards clean or ‘green’ technologies, e.g. fuels, products and 
processes, is partly the result of policy and partly market-driven; in the latter case a response 
to demand triggered by a new generation of young consumers. This transformation is affecting 
and transforming the value chain of mineral raw materials industries from the upstream to the 
downstream, e.g. from mining, products and processes along the value chain to end-consumer 
markets.   
The resources intensity of our economy and society will remain significantly high. Increasing 
quantities of mineral raw materials – some of them described as “critical raw material”1 – will 
be required to ensure the transformation to the low-carbon economy, both in the EU and 
globally2 and to meet growing market demand. Some speak of a “new age for metals and 
minerals”. Close to 60% of the demand for critical raw materials is associated with high-growth 
industries.3  
The combined effect has been to trigger political interest in new materials, which in turn raises 
concerns over security – availability and costs – of mineral raw materials. Consider, for example, 
China's export restrictions on rare earth elements, plus tungsten and molybdenum or President 
Trump’s Mineral Order to secure raw materials deemed critical to US industry and American 
economy. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether we are witnessing the beginning of a more 
security-driven approach to raw materials, minerals and metals.  
At the same time, the raw materials industry is affected by EU and global climate and energy 
policies. While on the one hand it enjoys major growth prospects, on the other, there are fears 
                                                     
1 Deutsche Bank, “Welcome to the Lithium-ion Age”, Markets Research, 9 May 2016. 
2 World Bank, “The Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for a Low Carbon Future”, Washington, D.C., June 2017. 
3 See Stephen Freiman, “Minerals, Critical Minerals and the US Economy”, testimony before the House Science 
and Technology Committee, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, Hearing on Rare Earth Minerals and 
21st Century Industry, US Congress, 16 March 2010;  and Joint Research Centre (JRC), “Critical Metals in the Path 
towards the decarbonisation of the EU Energy Sector: Assessing Rare Metals as Supply-Chain Bottlenecks in Low-
Carbon Energy Technologies”, European Commission, 2013. 
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that obligations arising from compliance with climate policies will affect energy prices and 
costs, and therefore its global competitiveness. 
Concepts like carbon footprinting or lifecycle product responsibility are increasingly being 
operationalised in order to guarantee (end) consumers that end products meet environmental, 
ethical and other standards. This development, alongside the digital and other technological 
transformations, can provide new opportunities for industry and create new value chains while 
possibly offering more sustainable production. 
This report analyses the potential implications of this transformation in the context of four 
salient challenges facing industry in the EU today: 
1. Building a strong innovation capability with the goal of supporting breakthrough market 
applications 
2. Securing access to raw materials, including secondary raw materials (e.g. urban mining), 
and through external trade 
3. Ensuring an affordable energy-cost base, while achieving EU and international climate 
objectives 
4. Consolidating an EU social framework based on a strong skills and employment base 
Challenge 1. Technological transformation and innovation: Evolution and disruption 
Maintaining the EU position in the industry by building a strong RD&I capability 
The mineral raw materials industry and its processes are undergoing rapid changes in response 
to the digital transformation.4 This is true both for the industry and for the final products. 
Products required by the industries’ consumers are designed and manufactured under what is 
called “Industry 4.0” (or the “4th industrial revolution”).5 Digitisation is also transforming the 
mining industry (“Mining 4.0”) where for example sensors and knowledge tracking offer higher 
resource and energy efficiency. New materials, for example for digital devices, are becoming 
increasingly complex. These revolutions have transformational effects on organisational 
structures, as well as on the industry’s standards and modes of operation and have indeed 
already led to the emergence of new industrial and businesses models.6 Innovation therefore 
takes place at different levels, with product (e.g. smart products), process and systems 
innovation having equal potential to contribute to industrial transformation. This innovation is 
unfolding in cycles, which generally include a gap (‘valley of death’) between the initial stages 
                                                     
4 See Jacques Pelkmans and Andrea Renda, “Does EU regulation hinder or stimulate innovation?”, CEPS Special 
Report No. 96, CEPS, Brussels, November 2014; and IW Consult, “Potentiale des digitalen Wertschöpfungsnetzes 
Stahl”, Köln, 2017. 
5 Hugh Durrant-Whyte, Ryan Geraghty, Ferran Pujol and Richard Sellschop, “How digital innovation can improve 
mining productivity”, McKinsey, November 2015.  
6 These new business models are spawning a technological revolution that disrupts an existing market and/or 
value network, and its existing demand patterns, leading to the creation of new firms, networks, alliances. 
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of R&D&I and successful market uptake and commercialisation at a later date. The EU’s 
experience suggests that a funding gap often emerges at the demonstration stage and 
sometimes, early deployment.   
Innovation policy enables future market potential 
Innovation policy is pertinent for the mineral raw materials industry first with respect to its 
output production, productivity and technological capabilities. The mineral raw materials 
industry is not only competing for deposits but also for new materials technologies and know-
how and patents. The raw materials composition of a product and their assembly into 
intermediate or final products play an important role in the process of innovation. They will 
most likely be the most critical constituents of the EU’s knowledge and scientific capability in 
the future, requiring more R&D in materials science, in general, and improvements in recycling 
processes, in combination with the development of competences and skills.   
Innovation and technology development tend to take place where the market is, i.e. where 
current and future demand and growth are found. This also implies that there has to be a 
business case for continued investment, without which innovation does not take place. With 
the transformation of industries, equally driven by decarbonisation, digitisation and 
automation, new industrial clusters will inevitably develop. Where exactly these new clusters 
develop depends strongly on the interplay between innovation and industrial policies (as well 
as climate, energy and trade policy more broadly). The EU can significantly affect change in 
innovation policy through funding mechanisms, as well as through its regulatory competence, 
e.g. for products, processes, emissions, etc. The success of the EU in launching its industry on 
a low-emissions pathway depends in part on its innovation policies. Low- and zero-carbon 
technologies, capable of transforming industrial processes, will require public support and 
strategies focused on industrial clusters and the adaptation of value chains, both inside and 
outside its borders, but also assisting regions in managing the transition. Innovation policy also 
involves identifying the EU’s strengths and weaknesses, the qualities of its industrial network 
and value chains (or its skills). From an investment perspective, this mix of innovation and 
industrial policies should ideally be predictable. While there are inherent political limits to how 
predictable a policy environment can be in a democratic and multi-level governance system, it 
does point towards the importance of reflecting innovation and industrial priorities in long-
term strategic policies. 
It is equally important that the fruits of innovation – whether publicly supported or not – further 
reinforce EU competitiveness, which requires the protection of intellectual property (IP) rights. 
The issue of IP rights is relevant both in the context of public innovation policies inside the EU, 
as well as externally in the context of trade agreements.  
Impact of EU policy-making on industrial development 
For firms in Europe, it is essential that they retain and, where possible, expand their capabilities 
to engage in research, development, and innovation (RD&I) activities as part of their day-to-
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day operations. Externalising such RD&I capability could be detrimental to long-term 
competitiveness as essential skills and knowledge might be lost. However, these activities can 
only be financed and supported on a sustainable basis if firms as a whole have access to 
sufficient levels of free cash flow. This pre-condition links back to the importance of ensuring 
that climate and energy regulations do not impose undue burdens on firms, and thereby erode 
their competitiveness. At the same time, the climate and energy policy framework needs to be 
sufficiently effective in order to also create a credible market for low-carbon products. Indeed, 
in the absence of a far-reaching climate policy framework, the contingent case for climate 
policy-induced industrial transformation and associated (innovation) policies disappears. 
Moreover, environmental regulations and policies can also support competitiveness by 
inducing process innovation, as per the Porter-hypothesis.7 
As industrial policy is primarily the prerogative of member states, and only a supporting 
competence belonging to the EU, EU policies may be inherently limited in what they can 
achieve with regard to industrial policy objectives. This is notwithstanding the fact that most 
EU policies in the field of innovation, climate, environment and energy have strong industrial 
policy implications. This points to the importance of coordinating member state activity at the 
nexus of innovation and industrial policy. The local political economy again plays a key role 
here, because these policies can have strong distributional impacts.  
Questions: Technology and innovation 
 Is Europe and its industry innovative enough and able to maintain its competitiveness to 
manufacture the products of the future? 
 How can innovation contribute to expand markets that will benefit European value chains? 
What is required to make this happen? 
 Can policy-making processes (in fields of direct impact of the EU, e.g. energy, climate, etc.) 
be set up to cooperatively build an industry strategy? 
 How might disruptive new technologies, such as in mobility and material science, affect EU 
value chains? 
  
                                                     
7 S. Ambec, Mark A. Coheny, Stewart Elgiez and Paul Lanoie. (2013), “The Porter hypothesis at 20: can 
environmental regulation enhance innovation and competitiveness?”, Review of Environmental Economics and 
Policy 7(1) 2–22. 
VALUE CHAINS BASED ON MINERAL RAW MATERIALS: CHALLENGES FOR EUROPEAN POLICY AND INDUSTRY | 5 
 
Challenge 2. Securing access to raw materials  
Via self-sufficiency and/or access through trade 
For those mineral raw materials where domestic production, i.e. mining, does not meet 
demand, stable trade rules have been a key strategy for securing access to mineral raw 
materials in the EU. In most cases, this is also true for exporters, which have an interest in stable 
export markets. Within the EU, trade is embedded in a European framework, including the 
internal market, and a host of other EU and national policies such as product standards, safety 
provisions or consumer protection in the case of final products. 
To address trade in raw materials – at least partially – the EU attempts to introduce Raw 
Materials (and energy) chapters in trade agreements. Cooperation with Africa has been 
ongoing for some time under the EU’s ACP programme involving 79 African, Caribbean and 
Pacific states). A trilateral dialogue between the EU, Japan and the US is devoted to materials 
substitutions for critical raw materials as part of the EU’s and Japan’s raw materials action plan. 
Trade tensions 
We should not, however, neglect the tensions that flare up from time to time between 
importers and exporters, as witnessed especially during the first decade of the 21st century. 
There has been talk of market manipulation at times when supply has fallen short. Among the 
best-documented disputes are the rare earth elements conflict in 2009 and the tungsten and 
molybdenum dispute of 2012, where export restrictions were imposed on these resources. The 
OECD inventory documents the numerous export restrictions8 imposing unilateral or 
coordinated limitations on the export of materials. For resource importers, the WTO offers the 
possibility to introduce anti-dumping tariffs.9 Both the Bush and Trump administrations have 
used this instrument to protect the domestic US industry.  
Tensions in the trade regime are also being compounded by the repeated requests of China to 
receive ‘market economy’ status under the WTO regime – a request firmly opposed by both 
the EU and the US. Last December 2017, a Minerals Order from the Trump administration10 
reflected a firm stance on the protection of critical raw materials and a stated attempt to 
protect national resources, as promised during the US electoral campaign. There is evidence 
that China is dumping semi-finished and finished products on other (e.g. US, EU), which has 
triggered antidumping measures. 
                                                     
8 See Jane Korinek and Jeonghoi Kim, “Export Restrictions on Strategic Raw Materials and Their Impact on Trade”, 
OECD, Paris, 2010. 
9 See OECD, “Export Restrictions in Raw Material Trade: Facts, fallacies and better practices”, Paris, 2014.  
10 US Department of the Interior, “Secretary Zinke Signs Order to Begin Process of Creating First Ever National 
Survey of Critical Minerals”, Press Release of 21.12.2017. 
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China – Asia – Latin America 
From 2000 to 2014, the industry has been faced with a boom cycle from emerging markets 
(China, Asia and Latin America), leading to a doubling of trade in these critical raw materials.11 
This demand cycle culminated in 2014, when China’s demand for steel declined for the first 
time in a decade, as a result of the Chinese government’s attempts to redirect the economy 
into higher added value products and services.  
China’s resource boom encompassed a wide range of minerals and metal products, but the 
authorities are now changing their trade policy approach. China announced that its 
manufacturing industry would be re-oriented towards the export of semi-finished and finished 
goods. Chinese authorities have announced mine closures and capacity limitations, most often 
on grounds of limiting air and other polluting emissions related to aluminium and steel 
production. There are diverging views on the impact of China’s policy on global commodity 
markets.12 Nevertheless, the patterns of China’s commodity plateau and its recent entry into 
recycling13 may signal a turning point for global commodity markets, for both supply and 
demand as well as for industrial production. 
Access to critical raw materials 
In 2009, the EU launched the Raw Materials Initiative14 with the objective of fostering 
diversification of and access to raw materials used in its industries. Its strategy involves i) 
assessing the risk of shortage in the supply of critical raw materials, with a view to promoting 
diversification of the sources and imports of raw materials; ii) supporting R&D in products ‘and 
processes’ substitution efforts and iii) formulating European policy proposals in the framework 
of the European 2020 industrial and knowledge base economy. 
Under this Initiative, the European Commission has drawn up a list of critical raw materials, 
which is subject to regular review and updated in light of the EU’s existing primary raw materials 
production capacities, e.g. for copper, zinc or lead, as well as main external sources of supply. 
It applies the ‘criticality’ concept,15 which focuses on both the scarcity of the geological 
resource in terms of its abundance and an assessment of the value chain’s self-sufficiency and 
vulnerabilities, including transport, and the potential for finding effective alternatives in 
                                                     
11 “Commodity Special Feature”, World Economic Outlook, IMF, Washington, D.C., October 2015. 
12 Ivan Roberts, Trent Saunders, Gareth Spence and Natasha Cassidy, “China’s Evolving Demand for Commodities”, 
Reserve Bank of Australia, Conference Volume, 2016. 
13 Jian Xiao, “Extended producer responsibility system in China improves e-waste recycling: Government policies, 
enterprise, and public awareness”, Elsevier, 2016. 
14 COM (2008) 699 Final, “The raw materials initiative — meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe”.  
15 M. Frenzel, J. Kullik, M.A. Reuter and J. Gutzmer, ”Raw material 'criticality'—sense or nonsense?”, Journal of 
Physics D: Applied Physics, Vol. 50, No. 12, 2017. 
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production processes or recycling.16 The latest EU critical raw materials list17 adds nine 
materials to the existing 2718 with certain regions being designated areas where the 
concentration of supply poses a risk to the European Union; in particular China and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.19 Cobalt appears on the EU critical raw materials list, while 
lithium does not on the grounds that its supply is seen as less concentrated and its economic 
importance less than in the case of cobalt. Industry has voiced criticism that although the list 
of critical raw materials has become longer, the measures the European Commission envisages 
might not be sufficient to effectively address the risks. 
Complementary initiatives are the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which aims to 
set a standard for good governance of the extractive industry20 and the EU Regulation on 
Conflict Minerals.21 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative is currently discussing the 
possibility of refining the self-sufficiency indicator so that its weight is balanced with other 
indicators, such as the contribution of the value chain to the overarching security policy goal, 
together with global decarbonisation goals. Taking such a value chain approach has the 
advantage that it directs efforts towards technological priorities and specialisation strategies 
while, in parallel, adapting to changing external policies objectives, particularly where they 
require secured and sustainable access to raw materials.22 On the product side, the concept of 
‘product stewardship’23 can help with mitigating environmental impacts and improve resource 
efficiency throughout the lifetime of a product. 
In addition, it suggests increased efforts towards recycling in the European Union, notably 
under the Circular Economy Framework objectives (see next section). 
Questions: Access and trade 
 What relationship should the EU develop with resource-rich region such as China/Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America under the aspect of access to mineral raw materials? 
                                                     
16 Matthias Buchert, Doris Schüler and Daniel Bleher, “Critical Metals for Future Sustainable Technologies and their 
Recycling Potential”, UNEP, July 2009. 
17 See Communication from the Commission on the 2017 list of Critical Raw Materials for the EU, COM (2017)490-
Final, 13 September 2017. 
18 CRM 2014 list: Barite, Bismuth, Hafnium, Helium, Natural rubber, Phosphorus, Scandium, Tantalum and 
Vanadium. 
19 T.E. Graedel, E.M. Harper, N.T. Nassar, Philip Nuss and Barbara K. Reck, “Criticality of metals and metalloids”, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2015. 
20  See The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative - https://eiti.org/  
21 EU Regulation 2017/821; Marta Latek, “Conflict Minerals”, EU Parliament, EPRS, Plenary March 2017. 
22 Alessandro Giovannini and Umberto Marengo, “Boosting TTIP Negotiations: A Value Chain Approach”, Istituto 
Affari Internationali, Rome, 2014.  
23 Product stewardship is a concept which aims at taking into account environmental impacts and responsibility 
during product design and over the life cycle of a product 
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 Should minerals, raw materials and certain metals still be classified as commodities? If 
not, what would they be?  
 What levels of self-sufficiency (or import dependence) for the different minerals and raw 
materials are appropriate to guarantee continued EU prosperity? 
 What indicators can be used to measure ‘secure access’? Should secondary materials, 
e.g. ‘scrap materials, be considered in such indicators? 
 What role will and can world trade and the WTO play in the future for minerals, raw 
materials and metals? What role should trade policy instruments play?  
Challenge 3: Global and EU energy, climate and resource efficiency policy  
Decarbonisation: Combining new market opportunities with the challenge 
to remain cost-competitive 
Policies to meet the EU decarbonisation targets, as well as renewable energy, energy efficiency 
and other environmental goals, as part of the Energy Union strategy, are impacting the 
competitiveness of industry. But it would be wrong to say that Energy Union is only about 
decarbonisation. There are five so-called dimensions to the Energy Union, including 
competitiveness, with research and innovation seen as a safeguard of future industrial 
competitiveness. The energy security dimension of the Energy Union relates to the overarching 
aim of ensuring access to affordable energy for businesses and consumers alike. The other 
dimensions are energy efficiency, an integrated internal energy market, and decarbonising the 
economy.24 
Decarbonisation goals as driving force and challenge to the energy system 
For some time now, the European Union has advocated more ambitious global climate change 
targets. The Paris Agreement on climate change in late 2015 has given new impetus to the 
global decarbonisation agenda. By now, all countries in the UN have signed the Paris 
Agreement, although the US declared its intention to leave the Agreement when it is eligible to 
do so in 2020. Parties to the Paris Agreement will have to increase their ambition level as part 
of the first “global stocktake” by 2023.25 The EU target of a GHG emissions reduction target of 
“at least 40%” by 2030 compared to 1990, formulated during the October 2014 European 
Council, is an indication of things to come.26 
For the long-term, i.e. 2050, an EU target that is compatible with the Paris Agreement’s level 
of ambition most likely will require meeting the upper band of the EU’s greenhouse gas 
                                                     
24 European Commission: “Building the Energy Union”. See: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-
strategy-and-energy-union/building-energy-union  
25 Article 14 Paris Agreement (http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/ 
english_paris_agreement.pdf).  
26 European Council Conclusions of 23-24 October 2014 (http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-169-
2014-INIT/en/pdf).  
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emissions reduction target range of between 80-95%, i.e. near complete decarbonisation of 
the EU economy and the need for negative emissions thereafter. A 95% reduction target means 
an annual ‘allowance’ of just some 280 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions for the EU, 
compared to over 4 billion tonnes in 2016. Agriculture alone currently accounts for more than 
400 million tonnes, meaning that all sectors in the economy should significantly, if not 
completely, reduce their emissions.27 
Reducing emissions intensity through increased efficiency may be sufficient to achieve near- 
and mid-term emissions reduction objectives, such as the EU’s 2020 goals. There are, however, 
inherent limits to efficiency improvements. The attainment of more stringent climate 
objectives in the future requires more transformational changes to the underlying products 
and production processes. It will also require significant quantities of renewable energy to be 
produced for both the electricity system as well as certain industrial processes. 
The energy transition as a challenge 
About four-fifths of EU GHG emissions come from energy use. Besides electricity generation, 
all the fuels currently used for industrial processes and heat will need to be addressed. This will 
dramatically increase demand for low-carbon energy – both electricity and hydrogen – not just 
for replacing current power demand but also for heating and cooling, transport and energy-
intensive industries. It has been estimated that an ambitious decarbonisation scenario of the 
chemicals industry alone would require some 1.900 TWh of low-carbon electricity by 2050. This 
represents approximately three times the current German annual electricity consumption or 
55% of what the International Energy Agency projects as European annual low-carbon 
generation in 2050.28 Steel decarbonisation could add up to additional 500 TWh. Including fuels 
would further increase demand very considerably. This will require massive construction of 
new infrastructure, requiring more raw materials such as copper, aluminium, steel, 
construction materials and many others. While, in principle, this is good news for industry, the 
concern is that EU climate and energy policy will drive up costs for EU industry to the extent 
that a (major) share of this new market will go to competitors operating outside the EU. 
Economies are already now connected via global technology value chains, in which investment 
apply state-of-the-art technologies globally sourced.  
                                                     
27 Figures derived from EEA. (2017). Trends and Projections in Europe 2017 (https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/ 
climate/trends-and-projections-in-europe/trends-and-projections-in-europe-2017) and the EU’s national 
inventory report (NIR) for 2017, submitted to the UNFCCC secretariat by the EEA 
(https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/european-union-greenhouse-gas-inventory-2017). 
28 DECHEMA (German Society for Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology), “Low carbon energy and feedstock 
for the European chemical industry”, Frankfurt am Main, July 2017. The DECHEMA study estimated demand for 
low-carbon power for a range of scenarios. The intermediate scenario, i.e. a moderate level of ambition depicts a 
bit less than 1.000 TWh, the ambitious scenario some 1.900 TWh while in the maximum scenario, i.e. the 
theoretical potential, demand would go up to 4.000 TWh. 
10 | FAURE-SCHUYER, EGENHOFER & ELKERBOUT 
 
The energy transition will challenge existing patterns of industrial localisation. Industrial sites 
will develop in locations where alternative fuels (e.g. low-carbon electricity and hydrogen) can 
be provided, where emissions can be captured and stored and where opportunities for 
symbiosis between different industrial processes exist. Local conditions and the political 
economy will affect how different regions adapt to, and benefit from, this industrial and 
economic transition. 
Competitive energy prices will be a challenge 
These dimensions taken together are relevant in the context of the energy prices faced by 
industry, where obligations arising from compliance with climate policies can affect energy 
costs and competitiveness. Increased electrification, as well as the (renewable) electricity that 
may be required for increased hydrogen production make electricity prices particularly 
relevant. At this moment, it is far from clear where and how this hydrogen could be produced.  
There may indeed be limits to transforming industries so that they are compatible with a 
decarbonised economy: energy costs may get too high, solutions such as carbon capture and 
storage may run into public opposition, and access to requisite raw materials and metals may 
become too costly. To the extent that these limits would be commonly acknowledged, it would 
require more attention to climate adaptation. For industries that are dependent on access to 
rare raw materials, dealing with potential climate impacts may become more important over 
time.  
Historically, EU energy prices have been among the highest in the world. At the same time, 
energy costs were comparable if not lower than those from competitors in many other parts 
of the world. This owes to European industry generally being among the most efficient.29 This 
situation however might change with a higher CO2 price in so far as the energy produced is 
subject to carbon constraints. While member states have the possibility to compensate electro-
intensive industries, increasing CO2 prices might make this option untenable from a political or 
fiscal point of view. A different picture emerges for natural gas. Comparing natural gas prices 
shows that American industry on average pays less than half compared to European 
competitors. However, gas prices are relatively little affected by EU policies and are (for now) 
more a function of regional commodity prices. The transformation of the gas industry towards 
more global competition offers prospects for globally converging gas prices. Gas could 
theoretically become a bridging fuel to hydrogen based steel making but to date is more 
expensive than coal/coking coal and therefore has cost implications.  
Obligations arising from compliance with climate policies will affect energy prices and costs. 
This might erode competitiveness of the sector, unless there is a truly global agreement where 
competing industries are subject to equivalent carbon constraints, which could for example be 
                                                     
29 European Commission, “Energy Economic Developments in Europe”, European Economy, No. 1, Brussels, 2014. 
See also report prepared by CEPS for DG Grow of the European Commission, “Composition and drivers of energy 
prices”, CEPS, Brussels, January 2017. 
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achieved through global carbon pricing, and in its absence, by carbon border measures, 
consumption-based GHG emissions accounting or global sectoral approaches, or other 
incentives. 
Circular economy potential still to be seen 
Potentially, new innovative solutions can be provided, for example, under the circular economy 
concept. The circular economy is based on methodologies evaluating the metals and minerals 
‘content’ present in industry and society, mainly in the form of products, buildings or 
infrastructure.30 It aims at ensuring that products are preserved rather than being discarded or 
dissipated over time, and that substances of very high concern are progressively eliminated to 
reduce pressures on the environment.31  
Still, it will not be able to guarantee a secure source of supply for the industry, as there are 
technological and economic limitations to recycling. If demand for metal has been growing 
significantly on a long-term basis, then the volume of end-of-life products coming back on the 
market will see a delay equivalent to its life-use. That means that in a period of steadily 
increasing demand, the supply of metal available for recycling will not be able to cover the gap. 
Additional primary metal would still be needed to meet the growing demand. At this stage, 
while the circular economy offers new prospects, it remains uncertain what the exact 
contribution of the circular economy to secure raw materials will be.  
However, the circular economy concept adds an important focus to the design phase of 
products (smart design). And in order to monitor progress towards circularity, monitoring of 
materials flows at specific points of the value chain will be required. Concepts of life cycle 
assessment (LCA)32 and life cycle inventory (LCI) that track emissions and flows will become 
increasingly important.33 Finally, taxation and accounting rules will greatly impact how 
circularity approaches will develop.34 
Questions: Energy and environment 
 Will EU policy be able to ensure access to affordable and secure energy in the long run? 
                                                     
30 See Markus Zils, “Towards a circular economy: Rethinking value chain to boost productivity”, Brussels 
Environment, 2015; and Briefing, European Parliament, “Circular economy package Four legislative proposals on 
waste”, January 2016. 
31 Christian Hagelüken, Ji Un Li Shin, Annick Carpentier and Chris Heron, “The EU Circular Economy and Its 
Relevance to Metal Recycling”, Recycling, 2016. 
32 Life Cycle Assessment - IEC (ISO 14040:2006, definition 3.2). 
33 Elsa A. Olivetti, Gerbrand Ceder, Gabrielle S. Gaustad and Xinkai Fu, “Lithium-Ion Battery Supply Chain 
Considerations: Analysis of Potential Bottlenecks in Critical Metals”, 2017. 
34 Vasileios Rizos, Arno Behrens, David Rinaldi and Eleanor Drabik, “The contribution G20 governments can make 
to the circular economy”, G20 Insights, 2017.  
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 Is EU climate and energy policy on track to accelerate the transformation of the EU 
industrial base to a low-carbon industrial base? 
 Are there limits to the decarbonisation of sectors, e.g. scale, access to mineral raw 
materials, or cost competitiveness?   If so, how can this be addressed while meeting EU 
and global climate targets?  
Challenge 4: Skills and employment  
New skills for a new world 
Skills and knowledge in general are an important pillar for competitiveness, growth and 
employment. For mining and processing, to serve as an example in this chapter, the European 
Commission notes that the sector “is reported to be characterised by a talent shortage”.35 It 
further records a decline of educational programmes although with a difference between those 
member states with a strong mining industry and those without one. Mineral processing 
graduates in Europe are negligible in a global comparison at around 1% of all graduates globally. 
Jobs move with the territory  
This might affect the future of the European mining equipment manufacturing industry, which 
– despite its low share of global raw materials production, has globally been competitive. Over 
the years, due to the increase in demand for metals and minerals, mine production has 
increasingly shifted to new regions, and mining equipment flows have followed; such a trend 
has been observed in other sectors too. Industry investment moves with growing markets. The 
EU is supporting the competitiveness of mining equipment manufacturing by a series of actions 
on innovative extraction and processing materials in the context of the European Innovation 
Partnership on Raw Materials. One of the objectives is to support the development of new 
techniques and technologies to open a path for new mining technologies to be commercialised. 
For example, automation of mines will allow access to mineral deposits in small quantities or 
those situated at greater depth. This might be able to slow the relative decline of EU mining 
manufacturing, but most likely it will not be able to reverse the trend in which mining 
equipment investment follows the mining activity.  
Revolution along the value chain 
The technological revolution of digital technology is affecting all stages and processes of the 
industrial value chain, from the upstream to the downstream. This digital revolution is bringing 
a new wave of process and product innovation. In processing activities, industry 4.0 already 
impacts on the reduction of downtime, through predictive maintenance and a smarter 
programming of maintenance cycles.36 All these developments together are having 
                                                     
35 European Commission, “Raw Material Scoreboard”, Luxembourg, 2016, p. 47. 
36 Hanno Kempermann, “Potentiale des digitalen Wertschöpfungsnetzes Stahl”, IW Consult, Köln, 2017. 
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transformational effects on the industry and on organisational structures, particularly on their 
modes of operations and on technical standards. And ultimately, they will require new ways of 
educating and training.  
New skills required 
Traditional jobs will disappear in all sectors, giving way to new opportunities in the new 
industries of the future.37 The ‘traditional’ career, where people would train for a particular 
field seems to be gradually disappearing. In the age of automation and smart systems, 
employment and employability will no longer be based solely on specialist knowledge. Although 
knowledge will always be important, life-long career success will be based upon key 
transferable skills that can be leveraged to succeed in business and organisations that probably 
do not even exist today. Digitisation and increasing process automation requires a transition to 
new skills sets, a process that is often described as “from linear to holistic”. For example, future 
qualification profiles are most likely be defined by a combination of both profound materials 
knowledge and IT skills. Traditional R&D work in laboratories is being replaced with increasing 
frequency by software-engineered simulations.  
These developments pose huge challenges to traditional education, which in the past has 
contributed to the current levels of industrial evolution and technological development. It is far 
from certain that the higher education system as it is today will be able to continue to teach 
the right set of skills and knowledge required for future work. A first question therefore will be 
how higher educational institutes will be affected by this industrial transformation and how the 
delivery of education will be transformed, for example by the internet and more advanced 
digital knowledge.  
 
Questions: Skills and employment 
 Will we still need people in the upstream industry? If yes, what skills are required? 
 What is more important: materials science or digital skills?  
 How can re-skilling be achieved? How can a sufficiently skilled workforce be found? 
 How can regions that are affected by mine closures and the decline of the associated 
industrial value chain be assisted to manage the impacts? 
 
                                                     
37 World Economic Forum, “The Future of Jobs: Employment, Skills and Workforce Strategy for the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution”, Global Challenge Insight Report, January 2016.   
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Conclusions 
Mineral raw materials are increasingly becoming critical to our economies. They are crucial 
components of the EU’s industrial base, producing a broad range of goods and applications 
used in everyday life and modern technologies, including sensitive technologies applied for 
example to military purposes.   
In part, demand is driven by technological developments such as digitisation, smart materials 
or disruptive technologies. Mutually reinforcing technologies such as mobile technology, the 
Internet of Things and data analytics create new markets or transform existing ones. Increased 
connectivity of people and things through mobile devices has contributed to the proliferation 
of new services and sharing models. Disruptive technologies such as autonomous driving, 3D 
printing, drones and renewable energy are transforming industry sectors and value chains, 
which often are described as Industry 4.0.  
Demand is also driven by policies to reduce greenhouse emissions in the EU and globally, for 
example by materials and energy efficiency, renewable energy and increasing electrification. 
This in turn will necessitate a massive construction of new infrastructure, requiring more 
materials such as copper, aluminium, steel, construction materials and many more. 
The growth in demand for mineral raw materials increasingly raises concerns over security – 
availability and cost – of mineral raw materials. This emerging debate on the ‘security’ of raw 
materials supply is echoing concerns we have dealt with for a long time in the energy domain 
and associated worries about the security of energy commodities, notably oil and natural gas. 
The difference with energy, however, is that raw materials cover a far more diverse set of 
materials and metals, which in addition, are used in diverse applications and many different 
economic sectors within Europe and elsewhere. We are also witnessing fast-changing value 
chains on the back of technological disruptions.  
Yet, this time round, governments seem to be taking a more assertive, and in some cases, pre-
emptive stance. Witness, for example, China’s disputes on rare earth elements or President 
Trump’s Mineral Order at the end of 2017. This new attitude may pose new challenges for EU 
trade policy. 
The future will provide new opportunities for industry, economic growth and jobs and will 
create new value chains. For EU industry – as well as the economy at large – being able to reap 
these benefits will require profound adjustment and intensified attention on the part of EU 
policy-makers to address the challenges of the transformation, as discussed in this report.  
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Annex 1: A note on terminology and a brief description of the mineral raw materials 
industry 
Terminology. This report covers non-energy and non-agricultural raw materials used for 
industrial purposes, such as non-ferrous metals (e.g. aluminium, copper, zinc, tungsten); ferrous 
metals (iron ore-based metals), or industrial minerals (e.g. graphite, kaolin) and aggregates. 
Mined ores (e.g. iron ore, bauxite, tungsten) and concentrates constitute extracted primary 
resources. The report also includes critical minerals, such as rare earth elements, used in small 
quantities in electronics, chemicals, defence and low-carbon industries. Raw materials and 
minerals are processed into transformed materials and end-products.  
The value chain of mineral raw materials operates together with downstream supply chains in 
such a manner that it can act as a source of supply, for example in the production of 
automobiles, aggregates used in the construction sector, paper products, plastics, glass or 
fertilizers.  
Security of supply refers to the uninterrupted supply of raw materials over a specific period of 
time. 
The industry. The mineral raw materials industry is immensely diverse. The term “raw 
materials” encompasses a wide variety of materials and metals used in many different 
applications and sectors, such as paper, automobile manufacturing, construction and fertilizer. 
In some cases, product and processes substitution is possible, although to a far lesser extent 
for critical raw materials.   
Mined ores are being processed and/or transformed throughout the mineral raw materials 
value chain.38 In these transformation processes, both intermediary and final products are 
being produced, including materials derived from recycling activities. The industrial value chain 
typically is separated into upstream, midstream and downstream phases. Each of these phases 
includes different production stages or activities, leading to product ranges, aimed at specific 
product uses in different sectors – whether transport, consumer goods, construction or other. 
Along the value chain, primary products and processed metals such as cobalt or scrap metals, 
are being transformed in multiple ways and are frequently recycled. 
There is often a differentiation between primary and downstream products. Primary products 
typically have a large spectrum of end-uses, such as steel-casted products or aluminium-
extruded products, which then are used in many applications, e.g. construction, vehicles, 
planes, ships or infrastructure. They are used in the global high-tech and eco-industries, such 
as wind turbines, solar panels, energy-efficient light bulbs, electric car batteries and biofuels.  
In some cases, raw materials can account for a considerable share of the costs in the production 
process, depending on the industrial value chain. For example, iron and iron ore constitute 
some 55% of total unit costs for the average output of steel plants. For aluminium, the 
                                                     
38 CSFB Equity Research, “Global Mining 2020 Capex”, 3 March 2017.  
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corresponding figure is 40%.39 In others, the quantities can be very small, yet they are critical 
and non-substitutable.  
Raw-materials intensity – comparable to energy intensity – can be an important factor for 
differentiating within manufacturing industries. For mineral raw materials, the upstream 
processes, i.e. mining, are a critical part of the value chain, typically because of high energy 
intensity. To cite but one example, secondary aluminium activities consume on average 5%of 
the total amount of energy consumed in primary aluminium production.40This does not mean 
that in cases, downstream or recycling activities can also be energy-intensive. 
The production and production capacities in the upstream processes often have a strong 
impact on midstream and downstream, depending on the sectors or value chains. When 
demand is high, market power shifts to the upstream relative to the rest of the value chain, 
leading to rising contract prices and in some cases, volume restrictions. This phenomenon has 
been reflected in the past through market squeezes in copper, iron ore or critical raw materials. 
In other cases, volume restrictions can be exogenous, e.g. resulting from government 
intervention in trade. 
 
  
                                                     
39 Ecofys, CEPS and Economisti Associati, “Composition and drivers of energy prices and costs: case studies in 
selected energy-intensive industries”, study commissioned by DG Grow, European Commission, June 2016. 
40 Joint Research Center, “Best Available Techniques – Reference Document for the non-ferrous metals industries”, 
2017. 
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Annex 2: Selected background facts and figures 
Since the financial crisis, EU manufacturing value added – measured as a percentage of gross 
domestic product – has been recovering from a low of 14.7% in 2009 to 16% in 2016 (World 
Bank data, 2016). The EU manufacturing industry generates economic wealth creation in the 
European Union and employs 29 million workers (Eurostat data, 2016). The EU is a net exporter 
of goods outside of its territories, with €1,745 billion of manufactured goods exported 
worldwide (Eurostat, 2017). According to 2017 data of the World Steel Institute the EU is 
responsible for the equivalent of 10% of crude steel production globally (World Steel Institute, 
2017). It imported 25 million tonnes of mineral raw materials (Country RME tool, October 
2017).  
Altogether, according to Indicator 7 of the 2016 Raw Materials Scoreboard, the mineral raw 
materials sectors are responsible for close to 40% of the value-added of the EU’s manufacturing 
sector. 
Import dependency 
The European Union is self-sufficient41 in construction materials – a group of materials referring 
to aggregates of sand, gravels, and stones – which are used in the European construction 
industry and largely traded on a regional basis. The situation is different for other raw materials, 
where import dependence exists.  
EU-28 Import dependency indicators, by raw material, 2000-16 
Source: Eurostat. 
Global Recycling Data 
Base metals (aluminium, copper, nickel, lead, zinc) have high recycling rates. Some 60% of 
aluminium is recycled from packaging, as reflected in Eurometaux / Industry data. Steel is the 
most recycled material with a rate of around 85%, according to 2014 data from the Steel 
Recycling Institute.  
Precious metals (silver, platinum, gold, platinum and rhodium) also have overall high recycling 
rates (+50%), as documented by the UNEP (UNEP – Recycling Rates: A status report, May 2011). 
                                                     
41 The position of the EU’s sourcing of materials vis-à-vis the rest of the world is measured by an indicator of import 
dependence, i.e. comparing its external trade relative to its ‘apparent consumption’. Apparent consumption refers 
to the level of consumption that would be required to absorb domestic production + net external trade. 
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Critical raw materials: 34 out of 60 materials have recycling rates less than 1%. This includes 
several critical raw materials: gallium, germanium, indium, tantalum, beryllium, vanadium, rare 
earths. 
EU Recycling Data 
Up to 90-95% of base metals consumed in the EU for building/construction or automotive 
applications is being recycled. For automotive applications, this is accounting for Directive 
2000/53/EC – also known as the "ELV Directive" and subsequent legislations; and this excludes 
end-products exported to third countries. Recycling rates for electronic wastes - wastes from 
electrical and electronic goods - stood at 34% as reported by Eurostat in 2014. 
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Annex 3: Products flows in raw materials – Metal ores and non-metallic minerals, 2008-
15 
 
Source: Eurostat's EU RME model – Scoreboard Indicators. 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total 445 388 379 396 369 373 350 346
Metal ores 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-metallic minerals 445 388 379 396 369 372 349 346
Total 425 346 373 378 343 353 394 401
Metal ores 255 175 217 216 206 206 217 206
Non-metallic minerals 169 171 157 162 137 146 177 195
Total 870 734 752 774 712 725 744 747
Metal ores 255 175 217 216 206 206 217 206
Non-metallic minerals 614 559 536 558 506 519 526 541
Total 295 254 259 268 241 249 272 285
Metal ores 161 115 136 142 136 135 132 130
Non-metallic minerals 134 139 123 126 105 114 141 156
Total 575 480 493 506 470 476 471 462
Metal ores 95 60 80 74 70 71 86 77
Non-metallic minerals 480 420 413 432 400 404 386 385
Raw Material Input
Exports (1000 t RME)
 Raw Material Consumption (1000 t RME)
Product Flows in Raw Materials Equivalents - RME
 Domestic Extraction (Mt RME)
 Imports (1000 t RME)
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